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CALIFORNIA CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE
WITH BYSTANDER CLAIMS FOR THE
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS:
THING V. LA CHUSA
George W. VanDeWeghe, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
One goal of tort law is to compensate victims who have been harmed
by negligent and intentional acts of wrongdoers.1 Historically, however,
courts have been reluctant to award damages for intangible harms such
as emotional distress, particularly when such harms have been caused by
unintentional conduct.2 Although courts have recognized a right to free-
dom from invasion of mental tranquility,3 they have been concerned with
the fair and efficient administration of justice.4 Courts developed "bright
line" standards to restrict both the number of potential plaintiffs and the
degree of liability defendants were likely to face.5 These bright line stan-
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1. W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
2. Id. § 54. The three principal reasons for limiting recovery for emotional distress are:
(1) the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often temporary and
relatively trivial; (2) the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or
imagined; and (3) the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy and disproportionate
financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for conse-
quences which appear remote from the "wrongful" act.
Id. § 54, at 360-61.
3. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952) (action for assault will lie on basis of threats of future violence where threats alone
resulted in fear and vomiting); Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7, 146 P.2d 57,
60 (1944) (chasing after person with unloaded gun and pulling trigger in threatening manner).
4. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 310-13, 379 P.2d 513, 523-24,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 42-44 (1963) (overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 729, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)).
5. See, eg., id. at 315, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (no recovery for bystander
who merely witnessed injury of another); Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232,
236, 249 P.2d 843, 845-46 (1952) (no recovery for mental disturbance caused by hospital giv-
ing mother wrong baby because there was no physical injury); Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y.
231, 234, 177 N.E. 431, 434 (1931) (no recovery without physical impact). Each of these
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dards were difficult to apply and produced inconsistent results."
In an attempt to strike a balance between compensating victims and
guaranteeing the validity of claims, the California Supreme Court, in Dil-
lon v. Legg,' established flexible guidelines to assist California courts in
evaluating claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).8
Cases over the past twenty years since Dillon, however, have demon-
strated that even these flexible standards do not offer satisfactory relief
for victims of NIED.9
In a 1989 case, Thing v. La Chusa,10 the California Supreme Court
once again attempted to define the requirements for NIED. 11 This Arti-
cle examines the soundness of the standards adopted in Thing. First, this
Article traces the history of the NIED cause of action. The Article then
analyzes the court's decision in Thing and discusses the potential
problems the decision created. Next, the Article evaluates alternative
ways of treating bystander NIED claims. Finally, the Article discusses
the practical consequences of Thing and suggests strategies for both
plaintiffs and defendants to consider when litigating NIED claims fol-
lowing Thing.
II. THE HISTORY OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CLAIMS IN CALIFORNIA
A. Evolution of the NIED Cause of Action
1. Mental distress damages for victims of negligent conduct
California courts first awarded damages for emotional distress
caused by negligent conduct when such distress was accompanied by a
physical injury. 2 Emotional distress was not recognized as an independ-
limitations was established to provide a guarantee that the claim was genuine. See PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 54, at 361-65.
6. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
7. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
8. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The guidelines specified were: (1)
whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; (2) whether plaintiff's shock re-
sulted from a direct emotional impact due to sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident; (3) whether plaintiff was closely related to the victim. Id.
9. See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
10. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
11. See id. at 661-68, 771 P.2d at 825-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 876-87.
12. See Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 184, 4 P.2d 532, 533 (1931);
Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 795, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115, 116 (1967).
The main distinction in the policy reasons for compensation of NIED claims and claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is that damages for IIED are designed to
punish truly reckless behavior. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n. v. Siliznotf, 38 Cal. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952). Claims for NIED, on the other hand, are awarded to compensate inno-
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ent tort, rather parasitic damages for emotional injuries were awarded in
conjunction with damages for physical injuries caused by an established
tort, such as assault or battery.13 Courts reasoned that the physical in-
jury requirement would provide a sufficient guarantee that the alleged
emotional suffering was not feigned.14
In a 1980 case, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,5 California
recognized NIED as a separate cause of action, permitting recovery for
emotional distress regardless of whether the plaintiff suffered physical
impact or injury. 6 The Molien court recognized that the question of
compensation should be based on whether the injury was serious, and
should not "turn on th[e] artificial and often arbitrary" distinction be-
tween physical and psychological injury. 7
2. Mental distress damages for bystanders of negligent conduct
a. the pre-Dillon rule
Traditionally, courts had been even more reluctant to award dam-
ages to accident bystanders than to direct victims of negligent conduct.'"
Prior to 1968, California courts permitted an accident bystander to bring
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the
bystander was physically in the "zone of danger" of the negligent con-
duct and as a result, feared for his or her own physical safety.' 9 The
cent victims. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 667, 771 P.2d 814, 829, 257 Cal. Rptr.
865, 880 (1989). Further consideration of IIED is outside the scope of this Article. See gener-
ally Vold, Tort Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 18 NEB. L. BuLL. 222
(1939).
13. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 54.
14. Id. § 54.
15. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
16. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
17. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The Molien court reasoned that a
prolonged mental disturbance would be compensated, whereas "transitory, nonrecurring phys-
ical phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting and the like, does not
make the actor liable." Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
18. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 54. The determination of whether a plaintiff is
a bystander or a direct victim is not always clear. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 659, 771 P.2d at
823, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 874; Newton v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 391, 228
Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1986) (court called this distinction an "amorphous nether realm"); see
also Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment
on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477, 515 (1982).
19. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 305-06, 379 P.2d 513, 518-19,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38-39 (1963). In Amaya, a pregnant mother witnessed the death of her 17-
month old son who was struck by a negligently driven truck. Id. at 298, 379 P.2d at 514, 29
Cal. Rptr. at 34. The court denied recovery to the mother noting that "the type of harm
allegedly suffered by plaintiff... [was] not reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 310, 379 P.2d at
522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42. The court also noted that the plaintiff was not herself in the path of
November 1990]
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California Supreme Court adopted this standard due to its concern that
permitting recovery for emotional distress experienced outside the zone
of danger would lead to an unacceptably high degree of liability.20 The
court, citing traditional tort law concepts, reasoned that mental distress
suffered by a mere bystander may not be reasonably foreseeable by the
negligent wrongdoer.21 If emotional harm to the bystander could not be
foreseen, then a duty to act with reasonable care toward that bystander
should not arise.22 Consequently, such a bystander could not recover for
any emotional harm suffered.23
b. Dillon and the rule offoreseeability
The zone of danger limitation was overturned in Dillon v. Legg.24 In
Dillon, a mother and daughter witnessed the death of another daughter
caused by a negligent motorist.25 The mother was standing on the curb
at a safe distance from the accident, but the other daughter was in the
street near the accident.26 If the "zone of danger" standard had been
applied to the facts in Dillon, only the daughter who was not injured
would have been entitled to bring a cause of action for NIED. This
daughter arguably was within the "zone of danger" and therefore, rea-
sonably could have feared for her own safety. The mother, however, was
not in the "zone of danger, ' 27 and her emotional distress did not result
from fear for her personal safety. Therefore, under the zone of danger
rule, the mother would have been denied any recovery for her mental
suffering.
The Dillon court considered this result, but concluded that it should
not deny recovery to the mother merely because she was not close
enough to the accident to fear for her own safety.28 The court noted the
"hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule" which would deny re-
covery to the mother but permit it to the sister standing only a few feet
away.
2 9
the negligent motorist, nor was she in any other manner threatened with bodily harm. Id. at
306, 379 P.2d at 519, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
20. d at 313-14, 379 P.2d at 524-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
21. d at 310, 379 P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 307-10, 379 P.2d at 520-22, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 40-42.
24. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
25. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
26. Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
27. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court stated: "We have, indeed, held that impact is not necessary for recovery.
The zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse because the only reason for the
[Vol. 24:89
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Instead, the Dillon court adopted a case-by-case approach, which
focused on the foreseeability of emotional injury to the bystander.30 The
court reasoned that absent a foreseeable injury, the tortfeasor should not
owe a duty to a bystander.3 In addition, the court instructed that such
foreseeability is based on an objective standard of "what the ordinary
[person] under such circumstances would reasonably have foreseen.
32
The Dillon court listed three factors to be used as guidelines to determine
whether an injury was foreseeable: (1) the location of plaintiff at the time
of the accident; (2) whether plaintiff's shock was the direct result of a
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as opposed to
learning of the accident after its occurrence; and (3) the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and victim.1
3
The court explained that "[tihe evaluation of these factors will indi-
cate the degree of the defendant's foreseeability."34 The court made clear
that these guidelines did not constitute an exhaustive list of considera-
tions, but rather provided examples of factors lower courts should con-
sider when determining whether an emotional injury was foreseeable.35
Applying these guidelines to the facts of Dillon, the court reasoned that
"[s]urely the negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may
reasonably expect that the mother will not be far distant and will upon
witnessing the accident suffer emotional trauma.
36
The Dillon court recognized that broadening the emotional distress
cause of action may lead to fraudulent claims and unjust liability.37 The
court noted, however, that fear of fraudulent claims" 'does not justify an
requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear the danger of
impact." Id.
30. Id. at 739-41, 441 P.2d at 919-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
31. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
32. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
33. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
34. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
35. I. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. "We cannot now predetermine defend-
ant's obligation in every situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the
extent of that obligation for every circumstance of the future. We can, however, define guide-
lines which will aid in the resolution of such an issue as the instant one." Id. A court subse-
quent to Dillon criticized the uncertainty created by Dillon, noting the unreasonableness of the
Dillon court in avoiding a definition of duty "because the court would know it when it saw it."
Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 655, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
36. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The court noted that
"'when a child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its mother will be some-
where in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock.' "Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 81 (quoting PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (3d ed. 1964)).
37. Id. at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The court noted that it was up
to "the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent in
particular cases." Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
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abdication of the judicial responsibility to award damages for sound
claims .... ' "3 The court reasoned that basing liability on the foresee-
ability of injury would satisfactorily limit liability in bystander claims for
NIED.39
B. Inconsistency Following Dillon
Despite the broad language used in Dillon v. Legg4' to describe
when bystander claims for NIED are appropriate, the NIED cases fol-
lowing Dillon did not significantly enhance the likelihood of recovery for
emotional distress suffered by bystanders.4" Many courts remained skep-
tical of a case-by-case approach which they feared might lead to fraudu-
lent claims and excessive liability. 2
The cases following Dillon created a myriad of inconsistent results
which often limited claims for NIED by applying the flexible Dillon fac-
tors as strict requirements. Despite compelling facts in which emotional
injury to the bystander seemed reasonably foreseeable, courts dismissed
claims if they found that the plaintiff lacked any of the three Dillon
guidelines-proximity to the accident, contemporaneous observation of
38. Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (quoting Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d
421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955)).
39. Id. at 742-43, 441 P.2d at 921-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82. The court commented that
basing negligent infliction of emotional distress on the foreseeability of injury was analogous to
theories applied in products liability and other cases. Id. at 742, 441 P.2d at 922, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 81. The court noted that imposing tort liability for product liability claims potentially could
encourage fraudulent claims; however, requiring foreseeability of injury adequately mitigates
threats of overly burdensome liability. Id. at 743, 441 P.2d at 922, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82. Simi-
larly, mental pain and suffering incident to a physical injury, loss of consortium, loss of enjoy-
ment of life, and several other damage claims may form the basis for a cause of action, even
though they are difficult to estimate and may expose defendants to unlimited liability. See
Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333,
355 (1984).
40. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
41. See, eg., Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977)
(no recovery where husband witnessed alleged negligent medical procedures during his wife's
labor which led to death of fetus, since his alarm did not ripen into debilitating shock until he
was later told of death); Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1980) (recovery denied where parents came upon scene of child's electrocution moments
after child released source of charge); Cortez v. Marcias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr.
905 (1980) (no recovery where mother witnessed child's death in hospital, but thought child
was only falling asleep).
42. See, e.g., Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973); Jansen v.
Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885 (1973);
Grimsby v. Sampson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975) ("even assuming there are cogent
reasons for extending liability in favor of victims of shock resulting from injury to others, there
appears to be no rational way to restrict the scope of liability even as attempted by Dillon's
three limiting standards").
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the accident, or relationship to the victim.4" For instance, since Dillon,
recovery has been denied to parents who arrived at the scene of an auto
accident soon after their children were injured' and fathers who
watched as doctors negligently caused their babies to be stillborn.4"
Courts have held that the facts of these cases do not satisfy the "sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident" guideline from Dil-
lon." Likewise, claims were denied where the bystander-plaintiff was
not related to the negligence victim by marriage or blood, despite any
other evidence of an extended and close relationship supporting the claim
for emotional distress. 7
The results in these cases did not reflect the flexible foreseeability-of-
injury standard that had been endorsed by the Dillon court.48 The vic-
tims in these cases were just as likely to suffer emotional distress as was
the mother in Dillon. For instance, in one case a baby's negligent death
and the resulting devastation of the father was sufficient to permit a
43. See, e.g., Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (two fathers
who witnessed negligently caused stillbirth of their babies did not fulfill contemporaneous sen-
sory perception requirement); Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1143, 197
Cal. Rptr. 411, 412 (1983) (cousins not close enough in relation to permit recovery);
Hathaway, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 736-37, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440 (finding child dying from electro-
cution did not fulfill contemporaneous sensory perception requirement); Drew v. Drake, 110
Cal. App. 3d 555, 558, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65, 66 (1980) (death of de facto spouse did not satisfy
relationship requirement); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 512, 146 Cal. Rptr.
495, 498 (1978) (parents who arrived at scene seconds after their daughters died in accident
failed to fulfill Dillon requirements); Jansen, 31 Cal. App. 3d at 75, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 885
(mother denied compensation after observing daughter's painful death due to negligent mis-
diagnosis because seeing result of negligence does not fulfill requirements); see also Bell, supra
note 39, at 339-40; Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compen-
sating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 478, 482-83
(1984); Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making
"The Punishment Fit the Crime, " 1 U. HAw. L. REv. 1, 46 (1979) (discussing NIED in both
Hawaii and California); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence
Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTNGS L.J. 583, 589 (1982).
44. See, eg., Parsons, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498; Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68
Cal. App. 3d 937, 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (1977).
45. See, e-g., Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
46. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The degree of
foreseeability of the third person's injury is far greater in the case of his contemporaneous
observance of the accident than that in which he subsequently learns of it. Id. at 741,441 P.2d
at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. However, a defendant is more likely to foresee that shock to the
nearby witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to anticipate that someone distant
from the accident will suffer more than a temporary emotional reaction.
47. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 277, 758 P.2d 582, 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 260
(1988); Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 1274-77, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875-78 (1987);
Drew, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 558, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
48. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-42, 441 P.2d at 920-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-82.
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claim. 9 Yet, in another case in which the father unquestionably exper-
ienced tremendous suffering as a direct result of a doctor's negligence,
recovery was denied."0 Similarly, parents in one case arrived seconds
after a fatal accident involving their children and were denied recovery,"
while, in another case a mother who arrived at an accident thirty seconds
after her son was injured was permitted to recover.52 In each case it was
reasonable to expect that close family members would suffer severe emo-
tional trauma as a result of the defendant's negligence. Some of the
claims, however, were denied because the Dillon guidelines were mechan-
ically applied rather than treated as indicators of what should be consid-
ered foreseeable. 3
In summary, post-Dillon courts have not followed the ad hoc fore-
seeability analysis described in that decision.14 By either mechanically
applying the Dillon factors or using alternative reasons for imposing lia-
bility,55 California courts often succeeded in limiting the conditions
49. Austin v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 357, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420, 421
(1979).
50. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111. Compare Austin, 89
Cal. App. 3d at 357, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (father could feel baby's heartbeat stop when he
placed hand on already deceased mother's body) with Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 584, 565 P.2d at
135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (fathers did not have physical proximity to incidents but did have
almost simultaneous knowledge that babies were dead). In each case the fathers watched as
doctors negligently delivered stillborn babies. The fathers in Justus were undoubtedly just as
traumatized by the stillbirths as the father in Austin. Thus, it makes no sense that the Austin
court permitted recovery and the Justus court did not.
51. Parsons, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (parents arrived at scene only
seconds after automobile accident in which their daughters were killed).
52. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256-57, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969)
(mother arrived at scene only moments after explosion in which her son was injured and saw
its grisly results).
One distinction which could explain why recovery was permitted in Archibald and not
Parsons is that explosions are far more rare than car accidents. For that reason, permitting
recovery would not expand either the class or liability of defendants greatly. Pearson, supra
note 18, at 506-07.
53. See, eg., Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 11; Parsons, 81
Cal. App. 3d at 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
54. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-42, 441 P.2d at 920-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-82.
55. In addition to relying on the three Dillon guidelines to find liability, courts avoided
traditional foreseeability analysis by using other theories for recovery. These three theories
provided grounds for NIED claims that did not require courts to wrestle with the standards
discussed in Dillon or try to reconcile the cases that followed it. For cases utilizing breach of
contract see Newton v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1986); Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984); Kately v.
Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983). For cases applying breach of
fiduciary duty see Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770
P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41,
194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807
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under which an emotional injury would be considered foreseeable.
5 6
Thus, courts avoided the potential danger of numerous, fraudulent
claims without justifying the rejection of more traditional, and previously
accepted, foreseeability-of-injury analysis.
III. THING V. LA CHUS4: CALIFORNiA ADOPTS BRIGHT LINES AND
HARSH RULES
The inconsistent decisions following Dillon v. Legg57 showed that
the California courts, because they were uncomfortable with the concept
of using an ad hoe foreseeability-of-injury analysis for NIED claims, had
failed to state a rule which would better govern future cases. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court attempted to rectify this situation in 1989, when it
decided Thing v. La Chusa.5
A. Factual Background and Lower Court Opinions
In Thing v. La Chusa,59 the plaintiff, Mrs. Thing, neither saw nor
heard the automobile accident in which her son was injured.' Mrs.
Thing rushed to the scene shortly after the accident occurred and found
her son lying in the street bloody and unconscious. While Mrs. Thing
may have suffered "great emotional disturbance, shock, and injury to her
nervous system as a result of these ... events,"' 61 the trial court held that
she did not specifically satisfy the proximity and sensory perception
guidelines listed in Dillon v. Legg.62
The court of appeal, however, reversed the trial court, citing another
California Supreme Court decision which concluded that "contempora-
neous awareness of a sudden occurrence causing injury to her child was
not a prerequisite to recovery under Dillon."63 The appellate court ex-
plained that a claim could be based on an injury resulting from an ex-
(1988). For a case relying also on "direct victim" status, see Molien, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d
813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
56. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
57. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
58. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
59. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
60. Id. at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
61. Id. at 647-48, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
62. Id. at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881; see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Dillon guidelines.
63. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 648, 771 P.2d at 816, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67 (citing Ochoa v.
Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985) (mother permitted
recovery after witnessing slow, painful death of her son caused by denial of treatment while
kept in correctional institution)); see Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72.
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tended course of conduct as long as the bystander-plaintiff observed the
defendant's conduct, the injury, and the connection between them."
This difference between the trial and appellate courts' interpretation of
Dillon highlighted the widely varying analyses of bystander NIED
claims.
B. The California Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
In view of prior inconsistent decisions, the California Supreme
Court considered the Thing v. La Chusa65 case to be a good "opportunity
to meet its obligation to create a clear rule under which liability [for
NIED] may be determined."66 After acknowledging the confusion in
cases and commentary following Dillon v. Legg,67 the California Supreme
Court's analysis of NIED recovery focused on the alternatives that were
at the core of the debate: (1) permit bystander recovery for NIED based
on an ad hoc assessment of whether such distress was reasonably foresee-
able, or (2) make the Dillon "guidelines" required elements for a by-
stander-plaintiff to state a claim for NIED18 The court evaluated these
two choices and determined that an ad hoc foreseeability analysis was an
inadequate basis upon which to find liability for intangible injuries. 69
The court reasoned that such an analysis was unpredictable and could
lead to excessive liability.7"
The court stated that "[i]n order to avoid limitless liability out of all
proportion to the degree of a defendant's negligence, and against which it
is impossible to insure without imposing unacceptable costs on those
among whom the risk is spread, the right to recover for negligently
caused emotional distress must be limited."71 In concluding that impos-
ing a duty based on an ad hoc foreseeability-of-injury analysis would un-
justifiably burden defendants, the court stated that " 'a bright line in this
64. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 661, 771 P.2d at 825, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
65. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
66. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
67. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
68. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 661-63, 771 P.2d at 825-26, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77.
69. d at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
70. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78. California is not the only state to
conclude that foreseeability is an inadequate test to limit liability. New York, Florida, Geor-
gia, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington, among others, are on record as
disapproving the expanded liability envisioned in Dillon. See Note, Tort Law - Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Accident Cases-The Expanding Definition of Liability, Dzi-
okonski v. Babineau, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. Rnv. 795, 801 n.34 (1979).
71. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 664, 771 P.2d at 826-27, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
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area of law is essential.' "72 It then adopted the three factors set forth in
Dillon 71 as requirements, each of which must be satisfied for a plaintiff to
recover for NIED injuries.' The court reasoned that the contemporane-
ous sensory perception, proximity and relationship conditions would de-
fine the defendant's duty to the bystander-plaintiff while also limiting the
defendant's liability.75
The California Supreme Court was not taking what it considered a
dramatic step in redefining a bystander's cause of action.76 The Dillon
court had recognized the need to avoid infinite liability by imposing "re-
strictions that would somehow narrow the class of potential plaintiffs."77
Unfortunately, courts subsequent to Dillon had failed to determine liabil-
ity in a consistent manner.78 The erratic decisions following Dillon had
done little to aid plaintiffs, defendants or the courts in the administration
of this volatile cause of action.79
In Thing, the California Supreme Court recognized that although
strict rules eased the adjudication of cases, they were not free from
problems. For instance, some plaintiffs with substantial injuries inevita-
bly would be excluded from recovery. ° The court in Thing reasoned,
72. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (quoting Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d
267, 277, 758 P.2d 582, 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 260 (1988)).
73. For a discussion of the Dillon case see supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
74. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
75. Id. at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
76. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The court concluded, "Experience
has shown that, contrary to the expectation of the Dillon majority, and with apology to Ber-
nard Witkin, there are clear judicial days on which a court can see forever and thus determine
liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable
limit on recovery of damages for that injury." Id.
77. Id. at 654, 771 P.2d at 819, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968)).
78. See, eg., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 76, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr.
863, 872 (1977) (NIED plaintiff, as "percipient witness," need not visually perceive accident in
order to recover); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 255, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 724
(1969) (NIED plaintiff need not be present at the accident scene in order to recover). But see,
e-g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 922, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831, 834 (1985) (NIED plaintiff who is "direct victim" need not prove physical harm and
accident or sudden occurrence); Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508,
523, 585 P.2d 851, 859-60, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1978) (NIED plaintiff must meet Dillon
requirement of "sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident"); Nazaroff v. Supe-
rior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 566, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664-65 (1978) (NIED plaintiff need
not perceive the accident if she suffered physical harm from "contemporaneous observation").
"The Dillon court anticipated and accepted uncertainty in the short term in application of its
holding, but was confident that the boundaries of this [NIED] action could be drawn in future
cases." Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 655, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
79. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of those cases.
80. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 666, 771 P.2d at 827-28, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79. The fact
that the rules in Dillon would not adequately address every situation was admitted by the
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:89
however, that "[w]hen the right to recover is limited in this manner, the
liability bears a reasonable relationship to the culpability of the negligent
defendant."'" Although the court noted the arbitrariness of the rules
which may exclude recovery for some injured plaintiffs, it believed these
shortcomings were offset by the value of the rules which limit liability.
82
C. Justice Kaufman's Concurrence
In his concurrence, Justice Kaufman urged that the Dillon v. Legg 3
guidelines did not go far enough to limit NIED.84 He urged that if cer-
tainty and consistency were truly desired, then the court should return to
the "zone of danger" rule.8" He also expressed his view that bystander
recovery should be eliminated because "[t]he interest in freedom from
emotional distress caused by negligent injury to a third party is simply
not.., an interest which the law can or should protect."86 Justice Kauf-
man's concurrence expressed concern for the public interest which would
not be served by adopting the arbitrary Dillon standards as strict require-
ments.8 7 According to Justice Kaufman, the newly adopted rules would
not relate rationally to the goal of compensation and would lead to unjust
Dillon court itself, which stated that "we cannot now predetermine defendant's obligation in
every situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obliga-
tion for every circumstance of the future." Dillon, 68 Cal. 3d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 80. Moreover, the California Supreme Court had made similarly dificult choices with
respect to other causes of action involving intangible injuries, where strict limitations were
imposed for policy reasons that the Thing court applied with equal force to limit bystander
NIED claims. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 664-65, 771 P.2d at 827-28, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
Adoption of rules that would limit the potential class of plaintiffs was supported by "the intan-
gible nature of the loss, the inadequacy of monetary damages to make whole the loss, the
difficulty in measuring the damage, and the societal cost of attempting to compensate the
plaintiff." Id. at 664-65, 771 P.2d at 827-28, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
81. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
82. Id. at 666-67, 771 P.2d at 828-29, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
83. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
84. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 675, 771 P.2d 814, 834-35, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 886
(1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 669, 675-76, 771 P.2d at 885, 887, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 834, 836 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring) (citing with approval Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379
P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963)).
86. Id. at 676, 771 P.2d at 835, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 674-75, 771 P.2d at 834, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (Kaufman, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Kaufman expressed concern that:
By what humane and principled standard might a court decide, as a matter of law,
that witnessing the bloody and chaotic aftermath of an accident involving a loved one
is compensable if viewed within 1 minute of impact but noncompensable after 15? or
30? Is the shock of standing by while others undertake frantic efforts to save the life
of one's child any less real or foreseeable when it occurs in an ambulance or emer-
gency room rather than at the "scene"?
Id at 675, 771 P.2d at 834, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
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results.88
D. The Dissenting Opinions
The dissenting justices disagreed with adopting the Dillon v. Legg89
guidelines as strict rules because they felt such adoption would operate to
limit the class of injured plaintiffs.9° In his dissent, Justice Broussard
concluded that the ad hoc determination of bystander NIED claims
based on Dillon's foreseeability analysis should be followed.91
"[T]he problem [of NIED] should be solved by the application
of the principles of tort, not by the creation of exceptions to
them. Legal history shows that artificial islands of exceptions,
created from fear that the legal process will not work, usually
do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into
oblivion."92
Justice Broussard argued that injustice would result from not compensat-
ing bystanders injured by a defendant's negligence. 93 He was not per-
suaded that an analysis which focuses on the reasonable foreseeability of
the injury would be unworkable to limit liability in a rational fashion.94
Justice Broussard argued that bystander NIED claims are no more un-
certain than several other areas of tort law which are served by foresee-
ability determinations.9"
88. Id. at 674-75, 771 P.2d at 834, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86 (Kaufman, J., concurring). In
Arauz v. Gerhardt, for example, the court denied recovery to a mother who arrived at the scene
of a car accident involving her child within five minutes of the event. 68 Cal. App. 3d 937,
949, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (1977). The court noted that the plaintiff was "not at the scene of
the accident at the time of the impact and [was] not near enough to the scene to have any
sensory perception of the impact.... ." Id. Justice Kaufman in Thing queried whether there
was any rational basis to infer that Mrs. Arauz was any less traumatized than Mrs. Dillon
because she first saw her bloody infant five minutes after being struck by defendant's car.
Thing, 148 Cal. 3d at 647, 771 P.2d at 834, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
89. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
90. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 677, 682, 771 P.2d 814, 836, 839, 257 Cal. Rptr.
865, 887, 890 (1989) (Mosk, J. & Broussard, J., dissenting); see Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41,
441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
91. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 677-89, 771 P.2d at 836-44, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887-90 (Mosk, J. &
Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk focused on the authority upon which the majority
relied and agreed with Justice Broussard's arguments. Id. at 677, 771 P.2d at 836, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 887 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
92. Id at 682, 771 P.2d at 839, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 890 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (quoting
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 747, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968)).
93. Id. at 684, 771 P.2d at 841, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 686, 771 P.2d at 842, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 685, 771 P.2d at 841, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (Broussard, J., dissenting). The
Dillon court had cited several examples of tort actions that are effectively handled using fore-
seeability to establish a duty as the basis of a claim. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 742-43, 441 P.2d
at 921-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82.
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Perhaps the most persuasive point in Justice Broussard's dissent was
his observation that no conclusive proof was provided that "Dillon has
significantly contributed to any substantial increase in litigation and in-
surance premiums."96 Increases in uncertainty and the costs of liability
were supposedly the motivating forces behind the Thing majority's deci-
sion to adopt strict rules.97 If the detrimental effects had not occurred,
then the majority's rationale disappears.
In a separate dissent, Justice Mosk noted that the authority cited by
the Thing majority to support its reasoning did not in fact condemn the
case-by-case approach articulated in Dillon.98 Additionally, Justice
Mosk noted that several commentators favored the expansive use of Dil-
Ion's foreseeability analysis rather than the artificial rules that the Thing
majority adopted.99
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions contributed any-
thing new to the debate that had occupied law review articles and deci-
sions since the Dillon case. Concerns over unlimited liability and
unsettled standards had been balanced repeatedly against the need to
compensate injured plaintiffs. 1 0 Rather than settling the issue with au-
thoritative guidance, the majority in Thing unfortunately set the stage for
further debate about how bystander NIED claims should be handled.
The ability of courts to limit liability predicated on tests largely based on foreseeabil-
ity is well illustrated by the "open car" cases. The prototype case is the suit against
the owner of a vehicle for damage caused plaintiff by a third party who can comman-
deer the vehicle because of the owner's carelessness in leaving the keys inside. In
Richardson v. Ham, we posited liability on the owner of a bulldozer because of a
"foreseeable risk of intermeddling," noting especially the great danger the bulldozer
created and the special temptation it presented to third parties.
I d at 742, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (citation omitted).
Applying the foreseeability test, the courts have held that the mere act of leaving a key in
an automobile, although it may possibly raise a foreseeable risk that the car will be stolen, does
not increase the risk of injury to other property and hence does not warrant liability. Id. at
742,441 P.2d at 921-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82; see, eg., Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 66,
271 P.2d 23, 27 (1954) ("even if she should have foreseen the theft, she had no reason to
believe that the thief would be an incompetent driver").
96. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 688, 771 P.2d at 843, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (Broussard, J., dissent-
ing); see Dillon, 68-Cal. 2d at 742-46, 441 P.2d at 921-24, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81-84.
97. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 683-86, 771 P.2d at 840-42, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 891-93 (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 677-80, 771 P.2d at 836-38, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887-89 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 41 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
99. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 681, 771 P.2d at 839, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 890 (Mosk, J., dissenting);
see, eg., Bell, supra note 39, at 409-10; Diamond, supra note 43, at 504; Miller, supra note 43,
at 47; Nolan & Ursin, supra note 43, at 609.
100. See, eg., Bell, supra note 39, at 354; Diamond, supra note 43, at 478; Miller, supra note
43, at 14; Nolan & Ursin, supra note 43, at 610.
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IV. "BRIGHT LINES" WILL NOT SOLVE THE CONFUSION OVER
BYSTANDER CLAIMS FOR NIED
The decision to adopt strict rules limiting the class of plaintiffs eligi-
ble to recover for NIED was more a choice of the lesser of two evils than
principled decision-making. The majority in Thing v. La Chusa 101 recog-
nized that adopting "arbitrary" rules would foreclose compensation to
some injured plaintiffs."0 2 The court, however, was unsympathetic to
NIED claims because, the court reasoned, emotional distress is "exper-
ienced by most persons, even absent negligence, at some time during
their lives."' 1 3 The court distinguished damages for intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress, which are punitive, from those for negligently
inflicted emotional distress."° Damages for NIED are not punitive, but
rather reflect society's belief that a negligent defendant should bear some
responsibility for the effects of the negligent conduct. 05 By limiting the
class of potential plaintiffs in NIED actions, the court reasoned that lia-
bility will bear a more reasonable relationship to the culpability of the
negligent defendant.106 The court balanced the potential of expansive lia-
bility and growing uncertainty against denying recovery to some injured
plaintiffs."0 7 In the court's opinion, expansive liability and growing un-
certainty posed the greater problem and justified the use of bright line
distinctions. 108
The decision to turn the Dillon guidelines into requirements was
based on two assumptions: (1) that defendant liability and insurance
costs are significant enough to warrant limiting the cause of action, and
(2) that trial courts would be incapable of adjudicating bystander NIED
claims without strict requirements on which they could rely. 1"9 A review
of the precedent and scholarly criticism shows that neither of these as-
sumptions was correct.
101. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
102. Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
103. Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828-29, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The court commented:
The emotional distress for which monetary damages may be recovered, however,
ought not to be that form of acute emotional distress or the transient emotional reac-
tion to the occasional gruesome or horrible incident to which every person may po-
tentially be exposed in an industrial and sometimes violent society .... The
overwhelming majority of "emotional distress" which we endure, therefore, is not
compensable.
Id. at 666-67, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
104. Id. at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id at 664-66, 771 P.2d at 827-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878-80.
109. Id.
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A. There Is No Evidence of the Need to Abandon Traditional
Foreseeability Analysis
The majority in Thing v. La Chusa 110 provided no proof to support
its conclusion that "unlimited liability" of NIED claims posed a signifi-
cant public problem."1 ' Despite the inconsistent decisions resulting after
Dillon v. Legg,112 there was no evidence that defendants had been so un-
foreseeably or unreasonably burdened that a need to limit the cause of
action existed. The Thing court's analysis focused more on the fact that
no fixed manner to predict and limit liability existed than on an examina-
tion of whether any abuses had actually occurred.
1 13
Professor Bell, one of the commentators cited by the Thing majority,
had concluded that the threat of unlimited liability did not pose a threat
sufficient to justify a limitation on plaintiff recovery like the one the
Thing court imposed. 4 In his article, Professor Bell pointed out that
"[d]espite the importance of the unlimited liability concern to opponents
of full recovery for psychic injury to bystanders, no one has satisfactorily
articulated why unlimited liability is such a major concern." '115 He criti-
cized decisions which provided no reason to limit liability other than a
perceived social need to do so.
1 16
110. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
111. Uncertainty rather than a reliance on facts appears to have formed the basis of the
court's conclusions. See id. at 656, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872. Prior to 1989,
critics had noted the initial reluctance of courts to expand a cause of action in a manner that
could lead to greater liability. Bell, supra note 39, at 362-63; Nolan & Ursin, supra note 43, at
607-08. As Professor Bell pointed out, however, "[t]he threat of those supposedly undesirable
effects is not likely to materialize." Bell, supra note 39, at 364-67.
112. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See supra notes 40-56 and
accompanying text for a discussion of post-Dillon decisions.
113. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 656-61, 771 P.2d at 821-25, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872-76; see also
Miller, supra note 43, at 17-18 (discussing influence that fears of unlimited liability had in
decision-making when tort rules were expanded).
114. Bell, supra note 39, at 364-67.
115. Id. at 363 (footnotes omitted).
116. See id. at 362-63; see also James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 48-49 (1972).
The court in Dillon pointed out that "the argument that 'there is no point at which to stop
liability' is no more plausible today than when it was advanced in Winterbottom v. Wright."
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 743, 441 P.2d at 922, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (quoting Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842)). In Winterbottom, a passenger of a mail coach was injured
when the coach collapsed. The court held that the coach owner owed no duty to the plaintiff
since the plaintiff was not in privity of contract with the coach owner. Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (1842). The court deemed that imposing the privity of con-
tract requirement would limit liability. Id.
In support of its conclusion that liability would not become overly burdensome, the Dillon
court cited products liability as an example of tort law that proved its critics wrong. Dillon, 68
Cal. 2d at 743, 441 P.2d at 922, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82. "In taking another giant step forward, in
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Commentators following Dillon had also concluded that the fear of
expanded liability for a tort cause of action did not justify placing limits
on reasonable foreseeability."1 7 These commentators reasoned that, in
other contexts, the uncertainty feared almost always failed to material-
ize.' 18 If unlimited liability were truly a problem, as the Thing majority
stated,119 its effect should have been easy to identify during the twenty
years following Dillon.12 0 In fact, history indicated "that the effect of
expanded bystander recovery for psychic injury on California liability in-
surance rates [was] negligible."''
B. Foreseeability Is a Workable Principle for Analyzing and
Controlling Bystander NIED Claims
If society is not overly burdened by bystander claims for NIED, the
majority's conclusion in Thing v. La Chusa 22 that it is necessary to
adopt strict rules loses its force. The only other compelling argument
that can be made for the adoption of strict requirements is that without
such requirements courts lack a rational framework for deciding NIED
claims. The Thing court accepted this premise'23 and concluded "that
reliance on foreseeability of injury alone in finding a... right to recover,
imposing product liability in tort, we were not halted by the specter of an inability to pre-judge
every future case. The setting of boundaries upon that doctrine makes the problem of fixing
lines of limitation here appear, by comparison, almost minuscule." Id.
117. See Bell, supra note 39, at 364; Miller, supra note 43, at 34 ("Fears of fraudulent
claims and opening the floodgates to litigation are today rejected as valid reasons for denying
claims even by courts that refuse to extend liability to cases in which the distress produces
physical injury ... ")_
118. Bell, supra note 39, at 366; Miller, supra note 43, at 34.
119. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 664, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
120. See supra notes 40-56, which discuss whether the post-Dillon cases resulted in an in-
crease in liability.
121. Bell, supra note 39, at 366. Arguably, society as a whole may benefit from increased
liability because the actual cost of conduct producing injuries would be paid to plaintiffs. See
Miller, supra note 43, at 21-27. Although he would permit recovery, Professor Miller would
place a limit on the amounts so that the liability would not outweigh the benefit it produces.
Id at 38. See also Bell, supra note 39, at 347-99 for a thorough cost/benefit analysis that
favors permitting bystander NIED claims. If claims for NIED are prevented by overly restric-
tive rules, such as those adopted in Thing, then victims will be forced to bear the costs of
rehabilitation, lost wages and similar expenses. Id. at 376.
Deterrence of negligent behavior which causes emotional distress could also be accom-
plished by permitting all reasonably foreseeable victims to bring bystander NIED claims. Ac-
tors may reconsider their activities if they faced the possibility of large NIED claims. See
Miller, supra note 43, at 23-25. This deterrence theory has been applied in other tort actions.
Id. at 24.
122. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
123. Id. at 663, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
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is not adequate when the damages sought are for an intangible injury."' 124
Judges and juries can decide when compensation is appropriate
based on their own experience and the evidence presented. 125 When used
as guidelines rather than rules, the three factors listed in Dillon help fo-
cus the trier of fact on those elements that appear most related to foresee-
ability. Moreover, judges can determine when juries have made an
award out of proportion to the defendant's culpability. 126 Advances in
psychological examining techniques provide a further check on poten-
tially fraudulent claims and exaggerated damages.1 27 Given these mech-
anisms, the fear of expanded liability should not preclude otherwise valid
claims 128 -especially when the application of effective tort law principles
will likely prevent that fear from becoming a reality.
129
The Thing court's conclusion that reasonable foreseeability is not a
rational analytical tool makes little sense. There is no reason to think
that harsh rules will lead to better judicial determinations. The tendency
since Dillon to treat the guidelines set forth in that case as strict rules has
led to inconsistent, unprincipled results. These results will become com-
pounded now that Thing mandates such strict rules. 130 With its history
of problematic precedent, it is hard to justify choosing the strict require-
ments over reasonable foreseeability as a rational basis for decision-mak-
ing. Like other courts faced with a problematic new cause of action,
1 31
124. Id at 664, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The court compared NIED with
loss of consortium, another intangible claim. Id. at 665-66, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at
878-79. In addressing the difficulty in measuring damages for an intangible injury, the Thing
majority noted" '[t]he intangible character of the loss, which can never really be compensated
by money damages; the difficulty of measuring damages; the dangers of double recovery or
multiple claims and of extensive liability-all these considerations apply similarly to both [loss
of consortium and NIED] cases.'" Id. at 666 n.8, 771 P.2d at 828 n.8, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879
n.8 (quoting Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 464, 563 P.2d 871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr.
315, 317 (1977)). But see Bell, supra note 39, at 351-91; Miller, supra note 43, at 17; Nolan &
Ursin, supra note 43, at 620.
125. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); see also Bell, supra note 39, at 354-56; Note, Limiting Liability for the
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L.
REv. 847, 854-55 (1981).
126. Bell, supra note 39, at 356.
127. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839; Miller, supra
note 43, at 34.
128. See Bell, supra note 39, at 370; Miller, supra note 43, at 34.
129. Besides failing to recognize that courts can function in the absence of strict, mechani-
cal rules, the court in Thing engaged in judicial activism in an area that appears better suited
for legislative regulation. See Bell, supra note 39, at 369; Miller, supra note 43, at 18. Unless
statistics and studies are provided, there is no way to be sure that the interests of insurers and
the public have been properly balanced.
130. See supra notes 57-82 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
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the justices in Thing succumbed to the fear that unless "bright lines"
were drawn, society would be harmed by unbridled liability.'32
V. CONVENTIONAL TORT LAW LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
PROVIDE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN HARSH RULES
A. Alternatives
Several alternatives to adopting the Dillon v. Legg'33 guidelines as
strict rules for stating a claim for bystander NIED exist."' Not all of
these alternatives would work better than the rules adopted in Thing v.
La Chusa,1 35 but at least they offer some reasonable bases for retaining a
more liberal injury foreseeability analysis.
One possibility is to reject freedom from emotional distress as a le-
gally protectable interest, abandon Dillon altogether and return to the
"zone of danger" rule.'36 In order to do this, courts must accept the
notion that third-party NIED claims are not something that tort law
"can, or should protect."'1 7 Restricting the scope of bystander claims in
this manner limits the risk of feigned injuries. 3s Moreover, refusing to
recognize NIED as an independent cause of action would avoid repeating
the confusion that followed Dillon. The problem with this approach,
however, is that some emotionally injured plaintiffs would not be
compensated.
A second possible approach for dealing with NIED claims, offered
by a post-Dillon commentator, is to base recovery on the plaintiff's
"emotional preparedness."' 39 This rule would limit bystander recovery
132. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
133. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
134. See generally Diamond, supra note 43, at 501-04; Miller, supra note 43, at 39; Nolan
& Ursin, supra note 43, at 69; Note, supra note 70, at 801-03..
135. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1989).
136. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of this rule. Justice
Kaufman supported this alternative in his concurrence. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 676, 771 P.2d at
836, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Kaufman, J., concurring). He pointed out that the "zone of dan-
ger' rule is less arbitrary than the Dillon factors and would avoid the institutionalized capri-
ciousness that undermines courts forced to reach unjust results. Id. at 675, 771 P.2d at 834-35,
257 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
137. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 676, 771 P.2d at 835, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring).
138. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 310-15, 379 P.2d 513,
522-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 42-45 (1963) (overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)). As additional support for its refusal to recognize freedom from
emotional distress as a protected interest, the Amaya court cited the elimination of the threat
of liability which may be disproportionate to culpability, and the impossibility of establishing a
"sensible or just stopping point." Id.
139. See Note, supra note 125, at 867.
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to those emotional harms that society decides people should not
be expected to absorb.... Courts would administer this stan-
dard by limiting recovery to cases of emotional distress that
most people do not face with sufficient certainty to anticipate, to
prepare for, and thus to absorb without suffering severe or per-
manent emotional damage. 140
For instance, a mother would not be expected to be prepared to witness
seeing her child killed by a negligent automobile driver and, therefore,
could state a cause of action.1
4 1
Unfortunately, this "emotional preparedness" approach contains
the same uncertainty and requires the same exercise of judicial discretion
that the majority in Thing criticized. 42 How will courts know what to
consider a normal part of life experience? Contrary to the beliefs of pro-
ponents of this approach, the emotional preparedness rule does not
promise to resolve the uncertainty and unlimited liability that concerned
the majority in Thing-for example, would inherently risky but ordinary
situations, like childbirth, always preclude recovery? Courts following
this approach would be forced to make determinations of preparedness
that could prove to be as arbitrary as the Dillon guidelines had been in
practice. 43
A third possibility is to consider both the foreseeability of emotional
harm and its seriousness. 144 This approach would give courts latitude to
accept claims that do not seem foreseeable, if the resulting emotional in-
jury were sufficiently serious.'4  By focusing on both foreseeability and
seriousness, courts should be able to "protect against fraud, multiple
claims, and unlimited liability without encountering the problems associ-
ated with their attempts to adapt Dillon's physical injury requirement
and guidelines to this purpose."' 14
In practice, however, this proposal would do little more than em-
140. Id. at 868.
141. Id. at 869. This approach is similar to the prior physical injury rule which rejected
NIED as a cause of action, but allowed recovery under certain extreme circumstances-such
as the negligent mishandling of corpses and the negligent transmission of a "death telegram."
See, e.g., Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943) (death tele-
gram); Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1979) (mishandling of corpse).
142. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 655, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
143. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inconsistent re-
sults reached by courts after Dillon.
144. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 43, at 609. This approach is an. adoption of Judge
Learned Hand's famous exposition of liability. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
145. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 43, at 609-11.
146. Id. at 610.
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phasize elements and principles already implicit in the language of Dil-
lon.' 47 The Dillon court noted that the purpose of "evaluation of the
factors [was to] indicate the degree of defendant's foreseeability."'
148
Similarly, this approach tries to link the degree of foreseeability to the
degree of culpability. That being so, this approach would be subject to
the same objections that the majority in Thing raised when it rejected
foreseeability of injury and opted for strict guidelines.
149
All three of these alternatives have flaws which make them suscepti-
ble to the same overly restrictive or overly broad criticisms with which
the majority in Thing struggled. One consistent theme in each proposal,
however, is that the Dillon guidelines alone do not provide a rational
framework for determining liability.
B. A Better Approach
A superior approach to bystander NIED claims would be to evalu-
ate claims using reasonable foreseeability as the standard, but limit the
amount of the claim to tangible, economic losses suffered by the plaintiff.
Whether emotional harm was reasonably foreseeable would be a question
of fact and should not be restrained to a consideration of the arbitrary
Dillon v. Legg' 50 factors.' 5 ' Under this theory, compensable economic
losses would include psychiatric bills and compensation for work days
missed due to emotional harm, but would exclude intangible harm such
as "feeling scared." This approach was rejected by the majority in Thing
v. La Chusa because it feared that liability would be uncertain and poten-
tially burdensome.'
52
The Thing court acknowledged that the "recovery by individual vic-
tims [would] be less," '153 but was troubled that a plaintiff's ability to re-
cover "would turn on fortuitous circumstances wholly unrelated to the
culpability of the defendant."' 1 4 The majority's reasoning, however, ig-
147. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 43, at 613.
148. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
149. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 663-64, 771 P.2d at 826-27, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
150. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
151. See Diamond, supra note 43, at 501-02; Miller, supra note 43, at 39. The Thing major-
ity rejected Professor Miller's proposal because:
permitting recovery of economic damages by all foreseeable plaintiffs would expose
defendants to risks no less arbitrary and unacceptable than those presently existing.
While the recovery by individual victims might be less, the number of potential plain-
tiffs traumatized by reason of defendant's negligent conduct toward another, would
turn on fortuitous circumstances wholly unrelated to the culpability of the defendant.
Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 663, 771 P.2d 814, 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 877 (1989).
152. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 663, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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nores the trial court's ability to dismiss a claim when the trial court finds
that the requirement of reasonable foreseeability has not been met. Ad-
ditionally, reducing damage awards supports the majority's policy of
linking liability to the defendant's culpability."' 5 With this in mind, lim-
iting recovery to tangible losses seems an adequate method to appease the
liability concerns which troubled the majority in Thing.
The Thing majority appears to have misinterpreted the commenta-
tors it cited who endorsed limiting recovery to tangible or economic
losses. Foreseeability analysis only poses a danger of overly burdensome
liability if plaintiffs are permitted to recover large damage awards for
unverifiable harms. 56 Utilizing a foreseeability analysis to determine
whether a duty is owed, coupled with a limitation on recovery, provides
sufficient limitations to safeguard against abuse without sacrificing valid
claims which may be dismissed under Dillon guidelines. 5 7
Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court chose a scheme with
which it was comfortable because, the court felt, it advanced certainty,
rather than a scheme designed to compensate all bona fide plaintiffs.
VI. THE FUTURE OF NIED IN CALIFORNIA
The cases that followed Dillon v. Legg'5 8 are good examples of the
way in which the strict rules adopted in Thing v. La Chusa , 9 will be
applied to bystander NIED claims in the future. 6" The California
Supreme Court's decision in Thing will not significantly change the delib-
eration process in courts that already treated the three Dillon factors as
requirements for plaintiffs to bring a cause of action. 6 Despite the clear
statement of the rule, hard cases will continue to challenge any barriers
preventing compensation. 62
155. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
156. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 662-63, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
157. See Diamond, supra note 43, at 501-04; Miller, supra note 43, at 38-43.
158. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
159. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
160. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of those courts'
decisions.
162. Cases where recovery was denied, like those discussed in the first section of this Arti-
cle, challenge any technical limitation that would prevent recovery. Professor Bell pointed out
that in addition to the theoretical inconsistencies to which strict rules lead, "the cost of erect-
ing such a barrier may be greater than its benefit." Bell, supra note 39, at 386. Professor Bell
discussed the costs and benefits of using foresceability analysis to permit compensation in sec-
tions IV and V of his article.
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A. Plaintiff Strategies
Plaintiffs face the difficult task of persuading a court either to over-
turn Thing v. La Chusa,163 or to find some unique exception to the three
requirements to justify recovery. Rather than claiming that the defend-
ant owed the plaintiff a duty based on the plaintiff's relationship to the
victim and the plaintiff's proximity to and sensory perception of the
event, plaintiffs should stress alternative grounds for establishing a duty,
such as products liability, 164 "direct victim" status, 61 or some independ-
ent fiduciary duty.'6 6 Each of these alternative grounds for permitting
recovery has been successful in the past in circumstances which indicated
that relief should be granted.'
67
For example, will hearing the blast that injures a family member still
satisfy the contemporaneous sensory perception requirement? 161 Can a
mother successfully claim damages when she witnesses only the gradual
death of a child?169 In the wake of decisions like Marvin v. Marvin, 170 in
which non-marital relationships gained legal recognition, can the courts
continue to deny recovery for emotional injury to common-law
spouses?
17 1
163. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
164. See, eg., Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983).
165. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980).
166. See, eg., Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805
(1983); Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984).
167. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
168. See Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
169. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
170. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Recognizing the legal signifi-
cance of a nonmarital relationship, the court in Marvin stated that:
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation
that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have
apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.... We conclude that the judicial
barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the fulfillment of the
reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship should be
removed.
Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. This language suggests that cohabitants
should have some right to bring bystander NIED claims because the court legally recognizes
their relationship and its similarity to a marriage.
171. Recent decisions show, however, that courts have not extended the reasoning in Mar-
vin to NIED causes of action. See Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 254 (1988); Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1987); Drew v.
Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980); see also Comment, A New Tort in
California: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (For Married Couples Only), 41 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 447 (1990).
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B. Defendant Strategies
In answering NIED claims, defendants in California should argue
that the limitations set forth in Thing v. La Chusa"2 exclude recovery
for such claims. Prior to Thing, when the Dillon v. Legg "3 guidelines
were not mandatory, courts often prevented recovery.17 4 Now that the
same guidelines are mandatory, defendants should have no problem cit-
ing pre-Thing cases to argue that courts should deny recovery.175 De-
fendants can also argue unlimited liability if the three conditions 76 are
not met-reasoning that had been very persuasive with courts in the
past.1 77 As a final argument, defendants can argue that the injury was
completely unforeseeable in any event.
If denial of the existence of a claim fails, defendants can try to limit
their losses by asserting a comparative negligence 178 or assumption of
risk defense.1 79 Whether their defenses apply in emotional distress cases
remain unsettled areas of the law, but the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed a somewhat analogous theory in Justus v. Atchison.1 ° In Justus,
the court concluded that volunteering to witness an inherently dangerous
and traumatic event such as childbirth precluded bystander NIED recov-
ery in this case.181
172. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
173. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
174. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
175. For example, a defendant's argument could be articulated as follows: One appellate
court found that arriving at the scene of the accident five minutes after it occurred precluded
recovery because the "contemporaneous observation" guideline was not satisfied. See Arauz v.
Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 940-49, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 621-27 (1977). Now that satisfac-
tion of the same guideline is mandated, five minutes again precludes recovery.
176. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
177. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
178. In Chambers v. United States, a father of a boy who was struck by a postal vehicle was
awarded damages for a NIED claim. However, the court reduced his recovery by twenty
percent due to his contributory negligence in his failure to supervise the child. 656 F. Supp.
1447, 1457-59 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
179. In Herman v. Welland Chemical Ltd., the defendant urged the dismissal of a NIED
claim based on the so-called "fireman's rule," which is predicated on the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk. 580 F.Supp. 823, 830-33 (M.D. Pa. 1984). Under the fireman's rule a person
whose ordinary negligence causes a fireman to be present at the scene of an emergency is not
liable to the fireman injured in the course of his duties. Id. at 830. The court acknowledged
the existence of this defense, but denied its use in this case since the firemen, whose wives
asserted the NIED claim, were volunteers. Id. at 832. The claims for emotional distress were
dismissed on other grounds. IM. at 833-36.
180. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 585, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 111 (1977). Although the
court did not go so far as to invoke the assumption of risk doctrine, the court stated, "the ever-
present possibility of emotional distress dissuades us from extending the Dillon rule into the
operating amphitheater in these circumstances." Id.
181. Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
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The "direct victim," products liability and fiduciary duty arguments
pose difficult problems for defendants to overcome because such argu-
ments circumvent the three Dillon/Thing requirements.182 Defendants
under these circumstances should persuade courts to utilize the analysis
in Thing rather than extend the cause of action in a manner that defeats
the limited liability upon which defendants rely.
Precedent is sufficiently inconsistent to provide favorable grounds
for both sides. Many courts were operating under rules similar to the
guidelines set forth in Thing prior to 1989, but still managed to reach
inconsistent results.183 Stare decisis will not operate conclusively in favor
of either side. Indecision over when recovery is appropriate will continue
despite what the majority in Thing would have us believe.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision reached by the California Supreme Court in Thing v.
La Chusa 84 reflects the issues and confusion that have plagued by-
stander NIED claims since 1968. The court met its stated obligation to
"create a clear rule under which liability may be determined," '185 but it
failed to provide a workable standard. The inherent flaws of strict rules
for limiting this type of tort action continue to go unaddressed. Courts
have shown already that following the rules mandated in Thing will lead
to inconsistent, unprincipled results. Ironically, Dillon v. Legg,186 the de-
cision which sought to expand recovery for bystander NIED by doing
away with artificial and arbitrary rules, is now being used as the model
for restricting the cause of action. Reasonable foreseeability of injury,
upon which the Dillon court strongly relied, was rejected in Thing as not
providing sufficient limitations of defendant liability.
The Thing majority offered no proof of the need for hard rules or the
inherent inadequacy of reasonable foreseeability as a check on fraudulent
claims. Despite the alternatives offered by thoughtful commentators, the
California Supreme Court chose to follow an extremely restrictive course
of action that is filled with loopholes. Rather than easing uncertainty
and confusion, the court has ensured that inconsistency will continue to
plague this cause of action.
182. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
184. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
185. Id at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
186. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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